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ABSTRACT 
This article explores the intersection of two policy considerations 
that shape, in part, California’s law of trade secrets: (1) the power of 
courts to impose attorney-fee sanctions on parties that bring or 
maintain trade secret claims in bad faith; and (2) the confidentiality of 
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settlement negotiations and mediation.  Both policies serve the 
purpose of efficiency in litigation.  To deter trade secret plaintiffs from 
litigating baseless claims, courts have broad power to sanction such 
conduct.  And to encourage early and informal dispute resolution, the 
law provides for robust confidentiality of settlement negotiations and 
mediation.  These consonant policies, however, can come into conflict.  
When what is said and done during settlement negotiations or 
mediation indicate that a party is acting in bad faith, a question arises 
whether that party’s words or conduct may be used as evidence in 
support of a request for sanctions. 
Is discouraging bad-faith litigation so important that a defendant 
may introduce evidence of what otherwise might be considered 
confidential?  This article concludes that (1) although the 
confidentiality of settlement negotiations is strong, it is narrow—it 
will readily yield to the policy of deterring bad-faith litigation; and (2) 
although the confidentiality of mediation is substantially broader—its 
protection of communications is nearly absolute—it may not shield 
certain forms of conduct from being used as evidence of bad faith.  In 
conclusion, this article offers practical advice to trade secret litigants, 
given the danger that what they say (and do) during settlement 
negotiations and mediation may return to haunt them. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Legal rules often reflect a balancing of social policy 
considerations.  In California, the law governing trade secrets is 
strongly shaped by such balancing.1  Indeed, California’s Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act (“CUTSA”) formally codifies the importance of 
intellectual property to our modern economy.2  A firm’s trade secrets 
can be central to its ability to develop and maintain a competitive 
advantage in the marketplace.  The law thus protects this information, 
setting forth, in detail, what constitutes a trade secret, and what one 
party must prove to establish that another party misappropriated its 
1. Trade secrets consist of information that “[d]erives independent economic 
value . . . from not being generally known to the public,” and that is the “subject of 
[reasonable] efforts . . . to maintain its secrecy.”  CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d) (West 
1997). 
2. Id. §§ 3426.1-3426.11. 
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trade secrets.  Moreover, the law recognizes that trade secret 
litigation, itself, can stifle competition.  Legislatures and courts have 
taken steps to discourage such anti-competitive conduct, penalizing 
those who bring or maintain trade secret litigation in bad faith.  
Specifically, in California, a party that brings or maintains a trade 
secret claim in bad faith may suffer the potentially crushing sanction 
of having to pay its adversary’s attorneys’ fees.3 
But the policy of discouraging bad-faith trade secret litigation 
conflicts, at times, with other important policy considerations.  For 
example, few principles are as central to the efficient operation of the 
legal system as the confidentiality of attempts to settle or mediate 
disputes short of costly and protracted litigation.  Thus, in California, 
settlement negotiations and mediation generally enjoy robust 
confidentiality.4  If it were otherwise, parties might hesitate to be 
frank and forthcoming in their attempts to resolve disputes out of 
court, and they might hesitate to mediate their differences.  Parties 
may fear that what they say or do could be used against them in later 
proceedings.  Removing that fear encourages candid, early, and 
informal dispute resolution—and reduces the time and cost that 
litigation might otherwise impose on the parties and the courts. 
What happens, however, when CUTSA’s fee-shifting rule collides 
with confidentiality?  What happens, for example, when a party’s 
settlement communications or mediation conduct clearly demonstrates 
that it pursued a trade secret claim in bad faith?  Is encouraging early 
dispute resolution so strong a principle that even such damning 
evidence must remain confidential?  Or is the need to discourage bad-
faith trade secret litigation—and thus safeguard appropriate economic 
activity—so powerful that it can allow the disclosure of otherwise 
protected communications? 
This article addresses those questions by exploring the impact of 
conflicting policies of discouraging bad-faith trade secret litigation 
and encouraging settlement of trade secret claims (meritorious and 
meritless).  In Part I, it explains the substantial power of California 
courts to grant a request for attorneys’ fees under CUTSA.  In Part II, 
3. Id. § 3426.4; see also FLIR Sys., Inc. v. Parrish, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 307, 312 
(Ct. App. 2009) (finding that trade secret misappropriation claims were brought in 
bad faith, and awarding $1.6 million in attorneys’ fees). 
4. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1119, 1152, 1154 (West 2009) (protecting 
mediation communications, settlement offers, and settlement demands).   
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it discusses the purpose and breadth of California’s protections for 
settlement negotiations, and how those protections can yield to the 
policy of deterring bad-faith trade secret litigation—permitting the 
admission of settlement negotiations to prove bad faith.  In Part III, 
this article describes the strong confidentiality afforded to mediation 
communications and how it likely withstands CUTSA’s fee-shifting 
provisions—but also suggests that mediation conduct may 
nevertheless constitute admissible evidence of bad faith.  In 
conclusion, this article provides practical advice to those involved in 
trade secret disputes, given that a subsequent request for attorneys’ 
fees under CUTSA may place settlement and mediation 
communications and conduct at risk of disclosure. 
I. CUTSA PROVIDES FOR FEE-SHIFTING SANCTIONS TO PUNISH AND 
DETER BAD-FAITH TRADE SECRET LITIGATION 
In the area of trade secret litigation, legislatures and courts pay 
special attention to claims brought with no objective basis and, 
moreover, in subjective bad faith.  Such claims can be used by 
unscrupulous litigants to strike at the heart of competition in a world 
increasingly driven by intellectual property.  Simply being forced to 
defend a trade secret claim can drain a firm’s resources and distract it 
from pursuing its main economic goals.  And of course, suffering an 
adverse judgment on such a claim—whether that judgment imposes 
injunctive relief, damages, or both—can compound these effects 
enormously. 
To protect against this harm, the law permits the target of a 
baseless, bad-faith trade secret claim to seek recovery of attorneys’ 
fees it incurred in defending that claim.  CUTSA, for example, 
provides that where “a claim of [trade secret] misappropriation is 
made in bad faith . . . the court may award reasonable attorney’s fees 
and costs to the prevailing party.”5  This is a sharp break from the 
normal rule that parties to a litigation generally bear their own 
attorneys’ fees—but California courts have explained that it is 
justified by the importance of discouraging improper interference with 
healthy competition. 
5. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.4 (West 1997). 
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A. Fee Shifting Is an Exceptional Sanction in American 
Jurisprudence 
Having to pay an adversary’s attorneys’ fees is, in the context of 
American jurisprudence, a significant sanction.  A core aspect of 
litigation in the United States—one so important it is simply known as 
the “American Rule”—is that “each party to a lawsuit must ordinarily 
pay his own attorney fees.”6  This principle has been part of 
California’s legal landscape since the 19th century, with its 1872 
inclusion in the Code of Civil Procedure.7 
Nonetheless, this hallmark of American litigation has exceptions.  
For example, private parties may agree that a “prevailing party” in a 
contractual dispute be awarded attorneys’ fees it “incurred to enforce 
[the] contract.”8  Similarly, under the private attorney general 
doctrine, a “court may award attorneys’ fees to a successful party 
against one or more opposing parties in any action which has resulted 
in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public 
interest.”9  In addition, and directly relevant here, a court may order 
that one party pay another party’s attorneys’ fees as a sanction to 
punish and deter frivolous, vexatious, or bad-faith conduct during 
litigation.10 
B.  Under CUTSA, Courts Have Broad Power to  
Award Attorneys’ Fees 
The statutory power to award attorneys’ fees as a sanction for 
bad-faith trade secret litigation has been extensively litigated.  Courts 
have thus defined the sort of “bad faith” that will warrant sanctions 
6. Trope v. Katz, 902 P.2d 259, 262 (Cal. 1995) (en banc).   
7. Id.; see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021 (West 2007) (“Except as 
attorney’s fees are specifically provided for by statute, the measure and mode of 
compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or 
implied, of the parties . . . .”). 
8. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1717(a) (West 1997). 
9. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West 2007).   
10. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.4 (West 1997); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.5 
(West 2007) (“Every trial court may order a party, the party’s attorney, or both to 
pay any reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by another party as 
a result of bad-faith actions or tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause 
unnecessary delay.”). 
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under CUTSA, made it clear that their power in this regard is broad, 
and discussed the kinds of evidence that will support a finding of bad 
faith. 
1. An Award of Attorneys’ Fees, as a Sanction, Is Warranted 
When a Party Brings or Maintains Objectively Specious 
Claims in Subjective Bad Faith 
Just over ten years ago, in Gemini Aluminum Corp. v. California 
Custom Shapes, Inc., a California Court of Appeal set the basic 
parameters of an award of attorneys’ fees under CUTSA.11  In that 
case, Taskmaster Industries Corporation (“Taskmaster”) hired Gemini 
Aluminum Corporation (“Gemini”) to provide aluminum parts for the 
“Taskmaster workbench.”12  The workbenches were manufactured by 
Taskmaster and marketed to the public by Makita.13  Gemini 
subcontracted with California Custom Shapes, Inc. (“CCS”) to 
“powder coat” the aluminum parts.14 
After Taskmaster began experiencing financial problems, Gemini 
stopped supplying it with parts and CSS began providing parts directly 
to Taskmaster.15  Gemini sued CSS, alleging, among other things, that 
CCS misappropriated its trade secrets.16  Gemini lost, and, under 
CUTSA, the trial court found that Gemini brought its 
misappropriation claim in bad faith—and awarded CCS over 
$160,000 in attorneys’ fees.17 
The Court of Appeal affirmed.  It first noted that neither CUTSA 
nor the California state courts had yet defined “bad faith” for the 
purpose of awarding attorneys’ fees.18  The court nevertheless held 
that a finding of “bad faith” under CUTSA “requires objective 
speciousness of the plaintiff’s claim . . . and its subjective bad faith in 
11. Gemini Aluminum Corp. v. California Custom Shapes, Inc., 116 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 358 (Ct. App. 2002). 
12. Id. at 361. 
13. Id.   
14. Id.   
15. Id. at 362.   
16. Gemini, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 362.  
17. Id. at 363. 
18. Id. at 367.   
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bringing or maintaining the claim.”19  In doing so, the court noted that 
CUTSA’s fee-shifting rule is meant to be a “deterrent” to such 
specious claims.20  The court further stressed that because an “award 
of attorney fees for bad faith constitutes a sanction, and the trial court 
has broad discretion in ruling on sanctions motions,” trial courts have 
broad discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees under CUTSA.21 
Applying these standards, the court upheld the sanction of 
attorneys’ fees assessed against Gemini.22  The court noted the 
complete “lack of any proof” that the trade secrets at issue had 
“economic value,” given that Taskmaster, the recipient of parts to 
which the trade secrets related, was essentially insolvent at the 
relevant time.23  Further, reflecting one of the core purposes of 
CUTSA—discouraging bad-faith, anti-competitive conduct—the court 
also noted that Gemini’s principal had repeatedly testified that CCS’s 
principal was a “snake.”24  The court thus found that a deterrent fee 
award was in order, because the evidence strongly indicated that 
Gemini brought suit, at least in part, to send a message to a competitor 
it did not like. 
2. Anti-Competitive Behavior Can Be Evidence of Objective 
Speciousness 
More recently, in FLIR Systems, Inc. v. Parrish, a California 
Court of Appeal indicated that an anti-competitive motive is at least 
one basis for finding that a party’s claims are objectively specious.25  
In that case, two shareholders and officers of FLIR Systems, Inc. 
(“FLIR”)—a manufacturer of infrared cameras, night-vision devices, 
and other “thermal imaging systems that use microbolometers”—left 
FLIR to start a new company to mass-produce microbolometers.26  
The former officers began negotiating with Raytheon Company to 
19. Id. at 367-68 (emphasis added) (citing and discussing Stilwell Dev., Inc. v. 
Chen, No. CV86-4487-GHK, 1989 WL 418783 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 1989)).   
20. Id. at 367 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
21. Gemini, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 367 (citation omitted). 
22. Id. at 370.   
23. Id. at 369.   
24. Id.   
25. FLIR Sys., Inc. v. Parrish, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 307, 314-15 (Ct. App. 2009). 
26. Id. at 312. 
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“acquire licensing, technology, and manufacturing facilities” for their 
new venture, and announced a timeline during which that company 
would begin mass-producing microbolometers.27  FLIR sued the 
officers to enjoin any misappropriation or threatened misappropriation 
of its trade secrets.28  At trial, the court found no such actual or 
threatened misappropriation—and further found that FLIR brought its 
case in bad faith, ordering it to pay over $1.6 million in attorneys’ fees 
and costs.29 
As in Gemini, the Court of Appeal affirmed.  In addition to 
finding that FLIR lacked any actual “evidence of misappropriation” or 
“harm,”30 the court concluded that “[o]bjective speciousness was 
established by evidence that [FLIR] had an anticompetitive motive in 
filing the lawsuit” and thus “filed a specious action as a preemptive 
strike” against its former officers.31  Indeed, FLIR’s CEO had testified 
that the company simply could not “tolerate a direct competitive 
threat” from its former officers.32  The court further found that FLIR’s 
subjective bad faith was evidenced, in part, by its unwarranted 
reliance on merely fearing a misuse of trade secrets.33 
3. Mere Speculation of Misappropriation Will Not Support an 
Argument that Claims Were Pursued in Good Faith 
In SASCO v. Rosendin Electric, Inc., a California Court of Appeal 
recently reaffirmed its broad powers to award attorneys’ fees as a 
sanction for bad-faith trade secret litigation—stressing that mere 
speculation that an adversary misappropriated trade secrets will not 
support a conclusion that a claim was brought in good faith.34  There, 
several management-level employees of SASCO, an electrical 
contractor, left the company and joined Rosendin Electric, Inc. 
(“Rosendin”), another electrical contractor.35  SASCO sued its former 
27.  Id. 
28. Id.   
29. Id. at 313. 
30. Flir, 95 Cal. Rprtr. 3d at 315. 
31. Id. at 314.   
32. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).   
33. Id. at 317. 
34. SASCO v. Rosendin Elec., Inc., 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d 828 (Ct. App. 2012). 
35. Id. at 830.   
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employees and Rosendin, claiming, among other things, 
misappropriation of trade secrets.36  The defendants moved for 
summary judgment, and after the parties engaged in “fierce discovery 
battles,” SASCO voluntarily dismissed its claims without opposing 
the motion.37  The trial court subsequently granted the defendants’ 
request for sanctions under CUTSA, ordering SASCO to pay 
approximately $485,000 in attorneys’ fees.38 
In affirming the fee award, the Court of Appeal followed Gemini 
and FLIR, explaining that: (1) “bad faith” under CUTSA includes both 
objective speciousness and subjective bad faith; (2) fee awards under 
CUTSA are a “sanction” meant to be a “deterrent to specious trade 
secret claims”; and (3) courts have “broad discretion” in imposing 
such sanctions.39  Finding no “evidence in the record supporting the 
claim that defendant[s] misappropriated SASCO’s trade secrets,” the 
court explained that it “was perfectly legitimate for Rosendin to hire 
the individual defendants and for the individual defendants to leave 
the employ of SASCO in favor of a competitor.”40  Mere 
“[s]peculation that the individual employees must have taken trade 
secrets . . . [did] not constitute evidence of misappropriation.”41 
4. Evidence of Subjective Bad Faith Comes in Many Forms 
It is thus clear that trial courts have broad discretion under 
CUTSA to sanction parties for bringing and maintaining objectively 
specious misappropriation claims—and doing so with subjective bad 
faith.  But this raises difficult questions of proof.  Although objective 
speciousness of a claim seems relatively straightforward as an 
evidentiary matter—does a party have evidence to support its 
misappropriation claims?—subjective bad faith is less concrete, and 
thus potentially more difficult to prove.  How does the target of 
36. Id. at 831.   
37. Id.  
38. Id. at 832-33. 
39. SASCO, 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 834 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).   
40. Id. at 837.   
41. Id.; see also FLIR Sys., Inc. v. Parrish, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 307, 317 (Ct. App. 
2009) (finding that FLIR’s subjective bad faith was evidenced, in part, by its 
unwarranted reliance on merely fearing a misuse of trade secrets). 
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objectively specious claims demonstrate subjective bad faith?  
Necessarily, such proof is likely to be a matter of reasonable 
inference.  As the Gemini court explained, a “subjective state of mind 
will rarely be susceptible of direct proof; usually the trial court will be 
required to infer it from circumstantial evidence.”42 
Circumstantial evidence of subjective bad faith can take many 
forms.  A court might, for example, infer from a “complete failure of 
proof” that a party “must have knowingly and intentionally prosecuted 
a specious claim.”43  In this way, objective speciousness may be so 
clear that it, alone, can support a finding of “bad faith” under CUTSA.  
Proving subjective bad faith thus can be similar to the manner of 
proving subjective malice in a malicious prosecution case, where such 
malice may be inferred, at least in part, from a lack of probable cause, 
an objective determination based on the lack of evidence supporting 
the unsuccessful underlying claim.44 
Sometimes, however, there is evidence from which a subjective 
state of mind can be more strongly inferred, such as when “the 
specific shortcomings of the case are identified by opposing counsel, 
and the decision is made to go forward despite the inability to respond 
to the arguments raised.”45  Evidence of this sort begins to shed more 
42. Gemini Aluminum Corp. v. California Custom Shapes, Inc., 116 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 358, 369 (Ct. App. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
43. Id. at 368.   
44. See Mattel, Inc. v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
794, 802 (Ct. App. 2002) (“Malice may be inferred from the lack of probable 
cause.”).  Courts have since clarified that subjective malice may not “be inferred 
solely from an objective lack of probable cause.”  Franklin Mint Co. v. Manatt, 
Phelps & Phillips, LLP, 109 Cal. Rptr. 3d 143, 191 n.10 (Ct. App. 2010) (Mosk, J., 
dissenting); see also Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche, 74 P.3d 737, 747 (Cal. 
2003) (“Merely because the prior action lacked legal tenability, as measured 
objectively . . . without more, would not logically or reasonably permit the inference 
that such lack of probable cause was accompanied by the actor’s subjective 
malicious state of mind.”) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and 
emphasis omitted).  An absence of objective evidence, however, remains relevant.  
See, e.g., Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif, 139 P.3d 30, 52 (Cal. 2006) 
(explaining that although a “plaintiff must plead and prove actual ill will or some 
improper ulterior motive . . . [m]alice may also be inferred from the facts 
establishing lack of probable cause”) (internal quotation marks, emphasis, and 
citations omitted).  
45. Gemini, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 369 (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also FLIR, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 319 (“A trade secrets claim could be brought in good 
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light on a party’s intent.  In addition, more direct evidence of 
subjective bad faith sometimes arises.  In Gemini, for example, the 
plaintiff’s principal “revealed his hostility toward [the defendant] and 
its principal,” testifying in open court that the defendant was “snaky,” 
that the defendant’s principal was a “snake,” and that he and the 
principal of a third company were “two snakes in a paper sack.”46  
Such personal animosity may, indeed, suggest an “improper motive,” 
and thus subjective bad faith.47 
But what about the statements or conduct of a party that does not 
occur in open court or otherwise—at least in the mind of the party—
“on the record”?  Is there a risk that statements made or conduct 
occurring in the context of settlement negotiations, or even mediation, 
may constitute evidence of subjective bad faith, to be later used in 
support of a request for attorneys’ fees under CUTSA?  As discussed 
below, the confidentiality of both settlement negotiations and 
mediation, to differing degrees, may indeed yield to the important 
public policy of deterring bad-faith trade secret litigation. 
II. THE ROBUST, BUT NARROW, CONFIDENTIALITY OF SETTLEMENT 
NEGOTIATIONS MAY YIELD TO THE POLICY OF DETERRING BAD-FAITH 
TRADE SECRET LITIGATION 
As the cases above demonstrate, trade secret litigation—and 
attorney-fee sanctions sought thereunder—can turn on the quantity 
and quality of evidence presented.  The touchstone for the 
admissibility of evidence, of course, is relevance.  Evidence is 
relevant if it has “any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any 
disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action.”48  And, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, all 
relevant evidence is admissible.”49  But some considerations are so 
faith but warrant attorney fees were the claim pursued beyond a point where the 
plaintiff no longer believes the case has merit.”).   
46. Gemini, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 369 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
47. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also FLIR, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 
315 (“Subjective bad faith may be inferred by evidence that appellants intended to 
cause unnecessary delay, filed the action to harass respondents, or harbored an 
improper motive.”). 
48. CAL. EVID. CODE § 210 (West 2009) (emphasis added).   
49. Id. § 351.   
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important that even relevant, material evidence is deemed 
inadmissible.  For example, to encourage free and open discussions, 
much of what is said between an attorney and client, or a physician 
and patient, while perhaps highly relevant, is nevertheless 
inadmissible.50 
Similarly, although often clearly “of consequence to the 
determination of the action,”51 evidence of settlement offers or 
demands, or communications relating to such offers or demands, 
generally are confidential—and thus inadmissible.52  Strictly 
speaking, these communications are not “privileged” as that term is 
defined in the Evidence Code.53  They are thus potentially 
discoverable.54  They nevertheless are “confidential” insofar as—
within limits—they may not be admitted into evidence at trial. 
A. Settlement Negotiations Enjoy Robust, but Narrow, Confidentiality 
The confidentiality, and thus inadmissibility, of settlement 
communications is “based on the public policy in favor of the 
settlement of disputes without litigation and [is] intended to promote 
candor.”55  In other words, the hope is that people will be encouraged 
to freely discuss the possibility of settlement without the fear of their 
words being used against them should such settlement not materialize.  
Indeed, the policy concerns at play are important enough that 
protection is afforded not only to settlement offers and demands, but 
50. See id. §§ 954, 994 (regarding attorney-client and physician-patient 
privilege). 
51. Id. § 210. 
52. Id. §§ 1152, 1154. 
53. See Covell v. Superior Court, 205 Cal. Rptr 371, 373 (Ct. App. 1984) 
(“Communications made in the course of settlement discussions are not ‘privileged.’  
Privileged matters are defined in Division 8 of the Evidence Code, comprising 
sections 900 to 1070.  Section 1152 of the Evidence Code is contained in Division 9.  
The statutory protection afforded to offers of settlement does not elevate them to the 
status of privileged material.  Our inquiry therefore must focus on whether discovery 
of settlement negotiations is ‘relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending 
action,’ or ‘appears reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible 
evidence.’”).   
54. Id. 
55. Zhou v. Unisource Worldwide, Inc., 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d 273, 276 (Ct. App. 
2007).   
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also, more generally, to “statements made in the context of settlement 
negotiations.”56 
Nevertheless, the confidentiality of settlement communications is 
limited in scope.  It is narrowly tailored to preclude the admission of 
such communications as proof either of liability or of the 
meritlessness of a claim.  Specifically, evidence that someone has 
made an offer to settle a claim, “as well as any conduct or statements 
made in negotiation thereof, is inadmissible to prove his or her 
liability for the loss or damage or any part of it.”57  Similarly, 
“[e]vidence that a person has accepted or offered or promised to 
accept” a settlement offer “as well as any conduct or statements made 
in negotiation thereof, is inadmissible to prove the invalidity of the 
claim or any part of it.”58 
This is not an unusual limitation on the admissibility of evidence.  
In general, the law attempts to avoid having socially desirable 
behavior affect the risk of legal liability.  One well-known example is 
the law of “subsequent remedial conduct.”  After harm has occurred, 
taking socially beneficial steps toward reducing the risk of future harm 
should be encouraged—and thus evidence of such steps should not 
place a party at increased risk of liability for the past harm.  Indeed, 
this is the law in California.59 
The policy of decoupling socially desirable conduct from 
increased risk of liability, however, does not preclude evidence of 
such conduct for purposes other than proving the merits of a claim.  
Thus, for example, although subsequent remedial conduct is not 
admissible to prove negligence,60 nothing in the Evidence Code 
precludes its admission to show that a party “exercised control” over 
56. Id. at 277 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
57. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1152(a) (West 2009) (emphasis added); see also CAL. 
LAW REVISION COMM’N, RECOMMENDATION PROPOSING AN EVIDENCE CODE, 7 
CAL. LAW REVISION COMM’N REP. 217 (1965) (explaining that this section “declares 
that compromise offers are inadmissible to prove liability”) (emphasis added).   
58. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1154 (West 2009) (emphasis added). 
59. See id. § 1151 (“When, after the occurrence of an event, remedial or 
precautionary measures are taken, which, if taken previously, would have tended to 
make the event less likely to occur, evidence of such subsequent measures is 
inadmissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the 
event.”). 
60. Id. 
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property on which harm occurred.61  Similarly, “Evidence Code 
sections 1152 and 1154 are not absolute bars to admissibility, since a 
settlement document may be admissible for a purpose other than 
proving liability.”62  Thus, for example, evidence of settlement 
negotiations is admissible “to show bias or prejudice of an adverse 
party.”63  As discussed further below, evidence of the bad faith of a 
trade secret litigant may similarly fall outside the confidentiality 
protections of the Evidence Code.64 
B. Settlement Negotiations Can Constitute Evidence of Bad Faith 
In FLIR, the Court of Appeal addressed the impact of what one 
might otherwise consider confidential communications—those made 
in the context of settlement negotiations—on a finding of bad faith.  
There, during settlement discussions with its former employees, FLIR 
demanded “$75,000, a non-competition agreement, an agreement that 
respondents would not hire [FLIR’s] employees,” and an assurance 
that the former employees would not challenge certain patent 
applications.65  The Court of Appeal explained that, in awarding 
sanctions, a trial court “may consider . . . bad faith settlement 
demands”—and found that FLIR’s “settlement terms were 
inflammatory, violated public policy, and were made in bad faith.”66 
But on what basis did the Court of Appeal in FLIR conclude that 
settlement communications—which parties generally consider 
confidential—are admissible evidence of subjective bad faith?  In 
other contexts, it seems clear that certain kinds of settlement 
communications cross ethical boundaries—and may be used to 
support an award of sanctions.  In the recently decided Mendoza v. 
Hamzeh, for example, Hamzeh, an attorney, sent a letter to Mendoza, 
an adverse party, demanding at least $75,000 in settlement of an 
61. Alcaraz v. Vece, 929 P.2d 1239, 1252 (Cal. 1997). 
62. Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 723, 728 (Ct. 
App. 2006) (holding that a plaintiff asserting an asbestos-based personal-injury 
claim could not withhold from discovery—or perhaps even preclude from admission 
into evidence—similar claims made against other entities).   
63. Moreno v. Sayre, 208 Cal. Rptr. 444, 450 (Ct. App. 1984).   
64. See infra Parts II.B, III. 
65. FLIR Sys., Inc. v. Parrish, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 307, 318 (Ct. App. 2009).   
66. Id. 
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underlying claim.67  Hamzeh also threatened to report Mendoza “to 
the California Attorney General, the Los Angeles District Attorney, 
the Internal Revenue Service . . . the Better Business Bureau, as well 
as to [Mendoza’s] customers and vendors” for various purported 
“transgressions.”68  Mendoza sued for, among other things, civil 
extortion.69  Hamzeh brought an “anti-SLAPP” motion, seeking to 
strike Mendoza’s complaint and requesting an award of attorneys’ 
fees.70  The trial court denied the motion—and granted an award of 
attorneys’ fees to Mendoza instead.71 
The Court of Appeal affirmed.  It first noted that under 
California’s anti-SLAPP statute, “a party may move to dismiss certain 
unmeritorious claims that are brought to thwart constitutionally 
protected speech or petitioning activity.”72  The court then explained, 
however, that “Hamzeh’s threat to report criminal conduct to 
enforcement agencies and to Mendoza’s customers and vendors, 
coupled with a demand for money, constitute[d] ‘criminal extortion as 
a matter of law,’” and thus was not the sort of speech protected by the 
anti-SLAPP statute.73  The trial court had properly denied Hamzeh’s 
anti-SLAPP motion and awarded attorneys’ fees to Mendoza in 
connection with opposing that motion.74  Although the Court of 
Appeal did not publish its analysis of the award of attorneys’ fees, the 
anti-SLAPP statute provides that “[i]f the court finds that a special 
motion to strike is frivolous or is solely intended to cause unnecessary 
delay, the court shall award costs and reasonable attorney’s fees to a 
67. Mendoza v. Hamzeh, 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d 832, 833 (Ct. App. 2013). 
68. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
69. Id.  
70. Id.  
71. Id. at 834. 
72. Mendoza, 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 834 (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (West 2007) (“A cause of action against 
a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of 
petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California 
Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to 
strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a 
probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.”). 
73. Mendoza, 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 836 (quoting Flatley v. Mauro, 139 P.3d 2, 
22 (Cal. 2006)). 
74. Id. at 837.  
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plaintiff prevailing on the motion.”75  Perhaps unsurprisingly, making 
extortionate threats in the context of settlement “negotiations”—and 
then defending those threats as “protected speech”—can subject a 
party to an attorney-fee sanction. 
Still, it is not clear to what extent settlement communications 
falling short of extortionate demands may be admitted as evidence in 
support of such a sanction.  The FLIR court purported to rely on three 
bases in permitting the use of settlement communications for this 
purpose:76 CUTSA; Gemini; and In re Marriage of Norton.77  None of 
these authorities, however, states that settlement demands may form 
the basis of a finding of subjective bad faith.  CUTSA does not 
mention it.  Although Gemini notes in passing that the parties briefly 
discussed settlement,78 the court in no way relied on those settlement 
discussions—or even suggested that they were relevant—in 
concluding that Gemini acted in bad faith.  And while Norton—a case 
involving a contentious custody proceeding—suggests that conduct 
frustrating the important policy of encouraging settlement may weigh 
in favor of imposing an attorney-fee sanction,79 the court nowhere 
discusses whether the parties had attempted to settle their dispute—
much less whether a trial court may consider the content of settlement 
communications in imposing such a sanction.  Moreover, the FLIR 
court nowhere addressed the question whether the confidentiality of 
settlement negotiations impacted their admissibility. 
Nevertheless, that FLIR failed to provide authority for its 
consideration of settlement discussions does not mean that the court 
got it wrong.  Indeed, to see that the court got it right requires little 
more than a literal reading of the Evidence Code.  As discussed above, 
statements made in furtherance of a settlement are inadmissible only 
to the extent that they are offered to prove that the party offering to 
settle was liable for an underlying wrong,80 or that the claim of a party 
agreeing to accept a settlement had no merit.81  Nothing in the 
75. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(c)(1) (West 2007). 
76. FLIR Sys., Inc. v. Parrish, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 307, 318 (Ct. App. 2009).  
77. 253 Cal. Rptr. 354 (Ct. App. 1988). 
78. Gemini Aluminum Corp. v. California Custom Shapes, Inc., 116 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 358, 366 (Ct. App. 2002). 
79. Norton, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 356. 
80. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1152(a) (West 2009). 
81. Id. § 1154. 
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Evidence Code precludes the admission of settlement negotiations for 
other purposes. 
For example, in the context of insurance claims, the law “does not 
preclude the introduction of settlement negotiations if offered not to 
prove liability for the original loss but to prove failure to process the 
claim fairly and in good faith.”82  And in malicious prosecution cases, 
such communications are admissible “to show that a case was litigated 
for an improper purpose.”83  It is no stretch of logic or language to 
conclude, then, that settlement negotiations also are likely admissible 
to prove that a trade secret litigant acted with subjective bad faith. 
III. THE BROAD CONFIDENTIALITY AFFORDED TO MEDIATION LIKELY 
PRECLUDES COMMUNICATIONS—BUT MAY PERMIT CONDUCT—AS 
EVIDENCE OF BAD FAITH 
Unlike the somewhat limited scope of confidentiality afforded to 
settlement communications, the confidentiality of mediation 
communications is quite broad.  In Cassel v. Superior Court, the 
California Supreme Court recently explained that “to encourage the 
candor necessary to a successful mediation, the Legislature has 
broadly provided for the confidentiality of things spoken or written in 
connection with a mediation proceeding.”84  Specifically, under the 
Evidence Code, “[n]o evidence” of statements made or writings 
prepared “for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a 
mediation or a mediation consultation is admissible or subject to 
discovery.”85 
Thus, mediation communications enjoy broad confidentiality.  
Indeed, the Evidence Code explicitly states that “[a]ll 
communications, negotiations, or settlement discussions by and 
between participants in the course of a mediation or a mediation 
consultation shall remain confidential.”86  This language strongly 
suggests that the confidentiality of mediation may not yield to the 
82. Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Prods. Sales & Mktg., Inc., 93 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 364, 411 (Ct. App. 2000) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
83. HMS Capital, Inc. v. Lawyers Title Co., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 786, 797 (Ct. 
App. 2004) (emphasis added).   
84. Cassel v. Superior Court, 244 P.3d 1080, 1083 (Cal. 2011).   
85. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1119(a)-(b) (West 2009). 
86. Id. § 1119(c).   
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policy of deterring bad-faith trade secret litigation.  As discussed 
below, this appears to be true with regard to communications.  But 
with regard to conduct, the strength of mediation confidentiality is not 
entirely clear. 
A. Mediation Communications Are Given “Maximum Protection,” 
and Thus Are Likely Inadmissible as Evidence of Bad Faith  
In Cassel, the Court explained that although the provisions 
described above “govern only the narrow category of mediation-
related communications . . . they apply broadly within that category, 
and are designed to provide maximum protection for the privacy of 
communications in the mediation context.”87  The Court has 
“repeatedly said that these confidentiality provisions are clear and 
absolute,” and that “[e]xcept in rare circumstances, they must be 
strictly applied.”88  Indeed, even in the face of important conflicting 
policy considerations—and even in the face of sanctionable conduct—
mediation communications remain confidential. 
1. Mediation Communications Are Confidential Even in the Face of 
Important Countervailing Public Policy 
The California Supreme Court has been explicit that the 
“maximum protection” afforded to mediation communications holds 
true “even where competing public policies may be affected.”89  In 
general, “[t]he Legislature decided that the encouragement of 
mediation to resolve disputes requires broad protection for the 
confidentiality of communications exchanged in relation to that 
process, even where this protection may sometimes result in the 
unavailability of valuable civil evidence.”90  Thus, the confidentiality 
of mediation communications trumps even the laudable public policy 
of deterring bad behavior among litigants.  As the Court has 
explained: “The Legislature chose to promote mediation by ensuring 
confidentiality rather than adopt a scheme to ensure good behavior in 
87. Cassel, 244 P.3d at 1094 (emphasis added).   
88. Id. at 1083.   
89. Id.   
90. Id. at 1096.   
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the mediation and litigation process.  The mediation statutes provide 
clear and comprehensive rules reflecting that policy choice.”91 
In Cassel, the Court held that the mediation privilege shielded 
from disclosure communications between an attorney and his own 
client, where the client intended to introduce those communications in 
support of a claim of legal malpractice.92  The holding in Cassel is 
worth pausing over.  Deterring legal malpractice is an obviously 
important goal.  Moreover, outside the context of mediation, the client 
in Cassel surely could have waived the attorney-client privilege to 
reveal the offending communications.93  The attorney-client privilege, 
after all, belongs to the client.94 
Nevertheless, Cassel instructs that inside the context of mediation, 
the client has no such power.  He or she may not unilaterally “waive” 
confidentiality—even to prove legal malpractice.  This is perhaps 
explained, at least in part, by the fact that mediation confidentiality, as 
with settlement confidentiality, is not a “privilege” belonging to any 
one party.95  Rather, it is a broad institutional policy meant to give 
“maximum protection” to information, not particular individuals.96  
And this maximum protection generally will not yield, even to the 
policy goal of safeguarding clients from legal malpractice. 
The Court has not directly addressed the question of whether the 
same is true with regard to the strong public policy meant to deter 
bad-faith trade secret litigation.  The logic of Cassel, however, 
strongly implies that as in the context of legal-malpractice claims, 
mediation communications are likely inadmissible to prove the 
improper motives of trade secret litigants. 
91. Simmons v. Ghaderi, 187 P.3d 934, 946 (Cal. 2008) (emphasis added). 
92. Cassel, 244 P.3d at 1087.   
93. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 958 (West 2009) (“There is no privilege . . . as to a 
communication relevant to an issue of breach, by the lawyer or by the client, of a 
duty arising out of the lawyer-client relationship.”).   
94. See id. § 953(a) (“‘[H]older of the privilege’ means . . . [t]he client, if the 
client has no guardian or conservator.”). 
95. See Wimsatt v. Superior Court, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 200, 208 n.4 (Ct. App. 
2007) (“[B]ecause the mediation confidentiality rules are not ‘privileges’ in the 
traditional sense, and because the Evidence Code does not use the phrase ‘privilege,’ 
we will use the term ‘mediation confidentiality.’”) (citations omitted).   
96. Cassel, 244 P.3d at 1094.   
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2. Mediation Communications Are Confidential Even When They 
Otherwise Would Support Sanctions 
Indeed, although California courts have not directly addressed 
whether mediation-related communications may be disclosed in 
support of a claim that a party brought or maintained a trade secret 
case in bad faith, the California Supreme Court, ten years prior to 
deciding Cassel, addressed an arguably more general—and thus 
inclusive—issue.  In Foxgate Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Bramalea 
California, Inc., the Court faced the “intersection” between the 
confidentiality of mediation-related communications and the question 
of whether a court may exercise its “power . . . to control proceedings 
before it . . . by imposing sanctions on a party or the party’s attorney 
for statements or conduct during mediation.”97  In that case and those 
that followed, it appears that the confidentiality of mediation 
communications is not likely to yield to the policy of deterring bad-
faith litigation. 
In Foxgate, a homeowners’ association brought a construction-
defect case against certain developers and subcontractors.98  The trial 
court ordered mediation, to which the parties were required to bring 
their experts.99  The defendants, however, not only were late to the 
first day of mediation, but also failed to bring any of their experts.100  
The mediator thus cancelled the mediation.101  The homeowners’ 
association moved for sanctions, ultimately seeking over $30,000 in 
attorneys’ fees and costs, relying on a declaration provided by the 
mediator in support of an argument that the defendants’ failure to 
properly participate in mediation was in bad faith.102  Over the 
objection of the defendants, who claimed that the mediator’s 
declaration was inadmissible under statutes governing the 
confidentiality of mediation, the trial court granted the motion.103  The 
97. Foxgate Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., 25 P.3d 1117, 
1119 (Cal. 2001).   
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 1120.   
100. Id.   
101. Id.   
102. Foxgate, 25 P.3d at 1120-22.   
103. Id. at 1122.   
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Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, instructing the trial court to 
provide a more detailed explanation of the basis for sanctions.104  In 
doing so, however, it rejected the defendants’ “confidentiality” 
argument, reasoning that the statutes governing the confidentiality of 
mediation were “not intended to shield sanctionable conduct.”105 
The Supreme Court disagreed.  It acknowledged the concern, in 
the face of California’s strong public policy favoring alternative 
dispute resolution, that the defendants may not have “participate[d] in 
good faith in the mediation process.”106  But the Court also recognized 
that “the Legislature has weighed and balanced the policy that 
promotes effective mediation by requiring confidentiality against a 
policy that might better encourage good faith participation in the 
process.”107  It thus held that “none of the confidentiality statutes 
currently makes an exception for reporting bad faith conduct or for 
imposition of sanctions . . . when doing so would require disclosure of 
communications.”108 
As the Cassel court explained, the “frank exchange” meant to be 
encouraged by confidentiality “is achieved only if the participants 
know that what is said in the mediation will not be used to their 
detriment through later court proceedings and other adjudicatory 
processes.”109  And according to the Foxgate court, this protected 
“frank exchange” reaches even to communications that might 
otherwise be sanctionable.  The protection of mediation 
communications could scarcely be broader. 
B. Mediation Conduct, However, May in Principle Provide a Basis 
for a Finding of Bad Faith 
Nevertheless, despite the broad nature of the statutes establishing 
the confidentiality of mediation proceedings, and the Supreme Court’s 
consistent interpretations of those statutes as “unambiguous” in doing 
104. Id.   
105. Id. at 1123. 
106. Id. at 1127-28.   
107. Foxgate, 25 P.3d at 1128. 
108. Id. 
109. Cassel v. Superior Court, 244 P.3d 1080, 1087 (Cal. 2011) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).   
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so,110 mediation confidentiality may not entirely shield a party from 
sanctions.  In analyzing the confidentiality of mediation, the Foxgate 
court noted: “The statutes are clear.  [They] prohibit[] any person, 
mediator and participants alike, from revealing any written or oral 
communication made during mediation . . . [and] prohibit[] the 
mediator, but not a party, from advising the court about conduct 
during mediation that might warrant sanctions.”111  Thus, while the 
Foxgate court meant to stress that the mediation-confidentiality 
statutes unequivocally prohibit any participant from revealing 
communications made during mediation, and also prohibit a mediator 
from revealing conduct during a mediation, it also noted that the 
language of the statutes does not prohibit a “party” from advising the 
court about conduct occurring during mediation.  Could this provide a 
narrow basis for supporting an award of sanctions based on a party’s 
bad faith? 
At least one court has answered that question in the affirmative.  
In Campagnone v. Enjoyable Pools & Spas Service & Repairs, Inc., 
the plaintiffs brought claims of negligence and products liability 
against the manufacturer, seller, and installer of a swimming pool 
filter that exploded, causing severe injuries.112  The plaintiffs 
prevailed at trial, and the defendants appealed.113  The Court of 
Appeal ordered mediation, under what the court described as the 
“relatively recent advent of court-ordered mediation of certain cases 
on appeal,” which, according to the court, “has been a resounding 
success.”114  After the defendants’ excess insurer, however, failed to 
appear at mediation—thus defeating the requirement that all parties 
have full settlement authority—the plaintiffs sought sanctions in the 
form of attorneys’ fees and costs, in excess of $19,000.115 
The Court of Appeal denied the request—but only because the 
excess insurer had not been notified of the mediation, and there had 
not yet been a published appellate decision holding that parties have 
110. Id. at 1094. 
111. Foxgate, 25 P.3d at 1125.   
112. Campagnone v. Enjoyable Pools & Spas Serv. & Repairs, Inc., 77 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 551, 555 (Ct. App. 2008).   
113. Id.   
114. Id. at 553.   
115. Id. at 555-56. 
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an obligation to provide such notice.116  The court made it clear, 
however, that “[h]enceforth,” sanctions would follow a failure to 
notify insurance carriers of court-ordered mediation.117  Moreover, the 
“unauthorized failure of a party, the party’s attorney, or a 
representative of a party’s insurance carrier, to attend a court-ordered 
appellate mediation” would “warrant[] imposition of sanctions” in 
future cases.118 
In reaching this result, the Campagnone court found a basis for 
distinguishing Foxgate and the broad confidentiality afforded 
mediation proceedings.  The court first noted its authority to “impose 
sanctions” for violations of the rules of court, and that “monetary 
sanctions . . . may include payment of the aggrieved party’s attorney 
fees and costs.”119  But the court also recognized that, because the 
plaintiffs sought sanctions based on mediation-related conduct, the 
“issue is complicated . . . by the confidentiality that is afforded to the 
mediation process.”120  Indeed, the court noted the broad language of 
the statutes providing for such confidentiality and, quoting Foxgate, 
recognized that “communications made during mediation or for the 
purpose of a mediation consultation” are unquestionably 
confidential.121 
Seizing on the Foxgate court’s further proposition, however, the 
Campagnone court explained: “On the other hand, the confidentiality 
rules do not prohibit ‘a party’ from ‘advising the court about conduct 
during mediation that might warrant sanctions.’”122  Thus, the court 
reasoned, the “failure to have all persons or representatives attend 
court-ordered appellate mediation . . . is conduct that a party . . . may 
report to the court as a basis for monetary sanctions.”123 
Accordingly, not all matters related to mediation are 
confidential—and some matters related to mediation may be used to 
support an award of attorneys’ fees as a monetary sanction.  Under 
116. Id. at 556.   
117. Campagnone, 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 556.  
118. Id. at 555. 
119. Id. at 553-54.   
120. Id. at 554.  
121. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
122. Campagnone, 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 554.   
123. Id. at 555 (emphasis added). 
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Campagnone, and under a straightforward reading of the statutes 
providing for mediation confidentiality, there is no obligation to keep 
certain forms of conduct confidential.  Thus, by extension, one might 
plausibly argue that the conduct of a party asserting trade secret 
claims under CUTSA, even where that conduct occurs in the context 
of mediation, might constitute admissible evidence of that party’s bad 
faith in connection with a request for attorneys’ fees.  Even the 
mediation privilege, it seems, might bend in the face of bad-faith trade 
secret litigation. 
But how far does this exception reach?  The Campagnone court 
indicated that “reporting anything more” than the sort of conduct at 
issue there—a failure to appear at mediation—“may violate the 
confidentiality rules.”124  In other words, if a party asserting a trade 
secret claim unreasonably fails to appear at mediation, perhaps that 
fact—and only that fact—is admissible to show bad faith.  This seems 
a slim reed on which to support a case for bad-faith litigation.  Could 
other forms of mediation-related “conduct” be admissible to show bad 
faith?  Plausible examples are difficult to conceive of.  Suppose a 
party makes disparaging comments, or even threats amounting to 
coercive conduct, at mediation.  Despite the important goal of 
preventing such coercion, it is not difficult to imagine a court 
considering those to be protected “communications.”125 
Suppose, however, that a party’s actions at mediation—perhaps 
via body language, tone of voice, or gesture—amount to non-verbal 
strong-arm tactics, or, alternatively, imply the absence of a good-faith 
belief in the claims asserted.  Would such conduct be admissible to 
show bad faith?  The answer might turn on the extent to which such 
non-verbal conduct is more or less plausibly described as 
“communication.”  Certainly some gestures meet that plausibility test.  
But perhaps other conduct does not.  In the right circumstances, it 
seems at least possible that litigation might be needed to decide 
whether conduct falls under what one might call the “Campagnone 
Rule”—and thus is available for use in a CUTSA fee request. 
124. Id.   
125. See, e.g., Provost v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 591, 604-
05 (Ct. App. 2011) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument, in support of an attempt to 
invalidate a settlement agreement, that he should be permitted to introduce evidence 
that he was “coerced” into signing it). 
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CONCLUSION 
Arguably, both CUTSA’s fee-shifting rule and the confidentiality 
of settlement negotiations and mediation serve the same goal: efficient 
dispute resolution.  The former policy—the “stick”—serves as a 
reminder that unjustifiably bringing or prolonging meritless litigation 
will be punished; the latter policy—the “carrot”—permits frank, open 
evaluation and discussion of settlement and mediation opportunities.  
These consistent legal rules nevertheless can come into conflict.  
When they do, there is a significant risk that the confidentiality of 
settlement communications may yield to the policy of deterring bad-
faith trade secret litigation; and that although mediation 
communications are likely to remain confidential in the face of this 
important public policy, mediation conduct, at least in principle, may 
be vulnerable to being used as evidence of bad faith. 
Parties to trade secret litigation should therefore be wary of what 
they say, and how they act, while attempting to negotiate a settlement 
or mediate a dispute.  While it should perhaps be unnecessary to say, 
being frank and forthright is not a license to act in bad faith.  In 
settlement negotiations, trade secret plaintiffs should thus avoid 
proposing settlement terms that are “inflammatory,” illegal, or that 
otherwise “violate[] public policy.”126  Avoiding extortionate threats 
needs little explanation.127  But even somewhat more reasonable 
parties may overreach.  In California, agreements under which a party 
is “restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business” 
generally are “void.”128  Thus, even if the results of doing so might at 
first blush seem desirable from a business perspective, a plaintiff 
should not demand non-competition agreements;129 concessions that a 
defendant will not hire the plaintiff’s employees;130 financial terms 
disconnected from the evidence;131 or agreements that a defendant 
will “assign” to the plaintiff intellectual property subsequently 
126. FLIR Sys., Inc. v. Parrish, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 307, 318 (Ct. App. 2009).   
127. See, e.g., Mendoza v. Hamzeh, 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d 832, 835-36 (Ct. App. 
2013). 
128. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2008).   
129. See, e.g., FLIR, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 318. 
130. See id. 
131. See id. 
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conceived.132  Furthermore, plaintiffs should not demand “market 
allocation” schemes, under which competitors carve up a market, 
effectively restraining one another from competing.133  And of course, 
personal attacks on an adversary, its employees, or its principal, 
should be avoided—even if you are convinced that you are dealing 
with “two snakes in a paper sack.”134 
Given the extraordinary strength of confidentiality attached to 
mediation, many of these concerns might be less pressing.  The 
“maximum protection” afforded to communications in the context of 
mediation likely shields even the sort of demands—and insults—
described above.135  Indeed, California’s Legislature did not “adopt a 
scheme to ensure good behavior in the mediation . . . process.”136  
Nevertheless, some conduct may cross the line.  Under the 
Campagnone Rule, a party may disclose an outright failure to appear 
at mediation as evidence of bad faith.137  It seems plausible to wonder 
whether functionally similar conduct—say, appearing at mediation but 
refusing to participate—might also constitute admissible evidence of 
bad faith.  Whether other forms of non-communicative conduct at 
mediation may support a request for sanctions is unknown, but it 
would be logically consistent with Campanogne for such conduct to 
132. Applied Materials, Inc. v. Advanced Micro-Fabrication Equip. 
(Shanghai) Co., 630 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1090 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (“Assignment clauses 
function as unlawful non-compete provisions where they require an employee to 
assign an invention conceived after departing from an employer’s service.”). 
133. Compare Guild Wineries & Distilleries v. J. Sosnick & Son, 162 Cal. 
Rptr. 87, 91 (Ct. App. 1980) (“It is settled that distributors cannot lawfully agree to 
divide territories or customers.  Such conduct is sometimes called a ‘horizontal 
restraint,’ and is a per se violation of the Sherman Act.”), with Dimidowich v. Bell 
& Howell, 803 F.2d 1473, 1482-83 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Guild Wineries . . . ignores the 
possible benefits to interbrand competition that can result from allowing restrictions 
in the intrabrand market.”). 
134. Gemini Aluminum Corp. v. California Custom Shapes, Inc., 116 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 358, 369 (Ct. App. 2002). 
135. Cassel v. Superior Court, 244 P.3d 1080, 1094 (Cal. 2011). 
136. Simmons v. Ghaderi, 187 P.3d 934, 946 (Cal. 2008).   
137. See Campagnone v. Enjoyable Pools & Spas Serv. & Repairs, Inc., 77 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 551, 555 (Ct. App. 2008); cf. Foxgate Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc. v. 
Bramalea Cal., Inc., 25 P.3d 1117, 1125 (Cal. 2001) (holding that mediation 
confidentiality precludes “the mediator, but not a party, from advising the court 
about conduct during mediation that might warrant sanctions”).   
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be admissible.  Thus, as in settlement negotiations, good behavior is 
good advice. 
Nevertheless, as is often the case in litigation and elsewhere, 
although behaving well may be necessary to avoid trouble, it may not 
be sufficient.  Even if a party brings and maintains an objectively 
meritorious trade secret claim in good faith, and is on its best behavior 
during settlement negotiations or mediation, a risk remains.  If the 
target of the claim prevails on the merits, there is little to prevent it 
from then alleging bad faith—thus opening the possibility that 
otherwise confidential communications might be revealed.  In other 
words, a successful defendant could seek to capitalize on its success, 
and, perhaps in a bad faith attempt to punish an unsuccessful-but-
sincere plaintiff, introduce evidence of settlement negotiations or 
mediation conduct in support of a sanctions motion.138  To prevent 
this, parties should always consider entering into express, written 
agreements that anything said—or done—during settlement 
negotiations and mediation will remain strictly confidential.  “Behave 
yourself” may be good advice, but “get it in writing” is even better. 
 
138. Of course, doing so could backfire if the court is convinced that the 
defendant did so in bad faith.  See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.5(a) (West 1997) 
(“Every trial court may order a party, the party’s attorney, or both to pay any 
reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by another party as a result 
of bad-faith actions or tactics[.]”). 
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